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Abstract 
Social desirability (SD)-bias is a serious threat for survey-data quality, and the respondents’ 
desirability beliefs have proven in many studies to predict the incentives for the strength as 
well as for the direction of this bias. However, the issue of the relative validity of different 
ways to measure these incentives has hardly received any attention. We introduced three such 
measures and discussed the respective tradeoffs between their parsimony on the one hand and 
the implied assumptions which have to be fulfilled on the other. In the empirical part of our 
paper, we tested with four questionnaire topics whether and how strong these assumptions are 
violated and thus how much measurement effort is necessary to obtain a sufficiently good 
indicator for the perceived incentives for SD-bias. These topics were: (a) having prejudice 
against the elderly, (b) making charitable donations, (c) participating in political elections 
and (d) being environmentally conscious. We found the most parsimonious one-point meas-
ure to be strongly affected by measurement error in the case of all questionnaire topics. De-
pending on how strong the assumption of monotony was violated, for some topics the me-
dium elaborated simple difference scores were sufficiently valid, but partly only the most 
elaborated domain-specific difference scores were a valid predictor for the potential strength 
and direction of incentives for SD-bias.  Desirability Beliefs and Socially Desirable Responding   2  
 
1. Introduction 
Social desirability (SD)-bias is a serious threat for the validity of survey data. Firstly, empiri-
cal evidence suggests that the response distributions for a variety of traits, as for example the 
participation in political elections, the consumption of alcohol or racial attitudes, are biased 
by social desirability (Belli, Traugott & Beckmann, 2001; Embree & Whitehead, 1993; 
Krysan, 1998). Secondly, and more serious for the aim of survey research is that SD-bias can 
create spurious or suppress real associations (Ganster, Hennessey & Luthans, 1983). This 
results when groups of respondents differ in the strength or even direction of SD-bias, and the 
resulting differences in survey reports artificially create or mask real differentiation between 
these groups. For instance, men have been found to overreport and women to underreport the 
number of sex partners, which falsely suggests a correlation between gender and promiscuity 
(Tourangeau & Smith, 1996). In order to statistically control for such distortions, it is a pre-
condition to measure the strength and direction of SD-bias.  
Depending on the theoretical framework, different factors are assumed to predict SD-bias. 
In Rational-Choice Theory, respondents are assumed to employ impression-management 
strategies in order to gain social approval from others. Psychological approaches, in contrast, 
predict SD-bias to result from the aim of ‘self-deception’, where the own person is the ad-
dressee of response bias (Paulhus, 2003). Regardless of which kind of SD-bias is under con-
sideration, the respondents’ social desirability beliefs are a key determinant for predicting the 
strength and direction of this bias. These beliefs, in the literature often referred to as ‘trait 
desirability’, represent the subjects’ expectations about how different answers are evaluated 
and thus are suitable for creating a favorable impression in others or themselves. Social 
norms about which characteristics are desirable in society are an important source of these 
beliefs, and thus, normative differentiation between respondents causes heterogeneity in the 
strength and direction of SD-bias (Tourangeau & Smith, 1996).  
With few exceptions, individual differences in the perceived incentives for SD-bias have 
been assessed by collecting desirability ratings of that response option which expresses that a 
respondent has the characteristic under consideration. This one-point measure (OPM) implic-
itly assumes not having the trait to be evaluated neutrally. As we will argue later, it is an im-
portant precondition for the validity of the obtained measure that this assumption – hereafter 
referred to as ‘neutrality assumption’ – is empirically justified. We will show that violations 
of this assumption require obtaining SD-beliefs for the presence and absence of the respec-
tive trait. Using simple difference scores (SDS) between both ratings is in the case of con-
tinuous traits, as for instance the consumption of alcohol, only a necessary but not sufficient Volker Stocké and Christian Hunkler     3  
 
   
precondition for an appropriate measure of possible SD-bias. This is the fact because the 
OPM and SDS assume the desirability to increase or decrease monotonically between the 
extreme endpoints of the trait-intensity continuum. Violations of this assumption – hereafter 
called ‘monotony assumption’ – always lead to an underestimation of the actual incentives 
for SD-bias. When this second assumption is violated, for example when moderate drinking 
is perceived to be more desirable then both abstinence and alcoholism, the valid measurement 
of incentives for SD-bias additionally requires the desirability rating for a medium trait inten-
sity.  
The aim of this paper is firstly to introduce the possible measures for respondents’ per-
ceived incentives for SD-bias, to make their underlying assumptions explicit and, in particu-
lar, to show the consequences when these assumptions are violated. The empirical part ana-
lyzes secondly for four continuous traits (a) whether the two assumptions hold and (b) to 
what degree violations lead to biased predictions about the strength and direction of SD-bias. 
The analyzed traits are: being prejudiced against the elderly, making charitable donations, 
voting in political elections and being environmentally conscious.  
 
2. Role of Desirability Beliefs in Predicting Social Desirability Bias  
In the conceptual model of answering survey questions proposed by Tourangeau and Rasin-
ski (1988), subjects are assumed to select an answer in the last of four stages, after the com-
prehension of the question, the retrieval of relevant information from memory and the judg-
ment of the response options. In the fourth selection stage, respondents may edit their an-
swers with respect to social desirability, either due to their desire for impression management 
or because of being susceptible to self-deception (Paulhus, 2003). In both cases, the respon-
dents’ SD-beliefs determine how strong and in the direction of which response option incen-
tives for SD-bias are perceived. These incentives, however, only lead to SD-bias when the 
respondents’ true characteristics differ from those which are regarded as socially desirable. 
Thus, the response bias predicted on the basis of SD-beliefs is an upper limit of what has to 
be expected in survey contexts.  
The rational-choice theory (RCT) of survey-response behavior is the probably most elabo-
rated approach for explaining impression management-based SD-bias (Esser, 1991; Stocké, 
2004; Tourangeau, Rips & Rasinski, 2000: 281). Here, survey answers are the result of an 
instrumentally rational selection between response options. Respondents strive to receive 
positive and avoid negative evaluation reactions from others in order to maximize their feel-
ing of social approval. Subjects utilize their SD-beliefs in order to form expectations about Desirability Beliefs and Socially Desirable Responding   4  
 
how present others will react when one of the available response options is selected (Esser, 
1991). In the case of an unknown audience, for instance a survey interviewer, desirability 
beliefs cannot be based on individualized knowledge about the actually employed evaluation 
criteria. Then, subjects rely on social norms as a best guess of what evaluation a certain re-
sponse will provoke (Stocké, 2004). Respondents are expected to deviate increasingly more 
from their ‘true’ answer when this answer is believed to be less desirable than an alternative 
response. Whether the less desirable option is negatively evaluated or only less positively 
than the more desirable alternative, is assumed not to matter for the resulting incentives.  
In the case of SD-bias driven by ‘self-deception’, others being able to perceive and sanc-
tion the response behavior are not assumed to matter for whether a difference between the 
true score and the most desirable answer leads to SD-bias (Paulhus, 2003). Here, the respon-
dents’ aim is to preserve a positive self-image and thus they themselves are the addressees for 
socially desirable responding. The SD-beliefs are, however, also the basis for realizing this 
aim.  
3. Measures of Desirability Beliefs and Their Underlying Assumptions  
SD-beliefs have been proposed to be either operationalized as personally or extrinsically ex-
pected trait desirability. In the first case, a sample of respondents evaluate how desirable they 
personally regard a particular characteristic, and aggregated scores of these judgments are 
assumed to represent the incentives for SD-bias (Meleddu & Guicciardi, 1998). This is a 
valid indicator when (a) the underlying personal preferences represent the normative climate 
in the surveyed population and when (b) the sample of informants is representative for those 
respondents for which the aim is to predict SD-bias. At least the first precondition has been 
found not to be given empirically (Crott & Baltes, 1973). In contrast, the concept of extrinsi-
cally expected trait desirability directly assesses how the respondents perceive the trait under 
consideration to be evaluated in society. This measurement concept has been applied in the 
majority of empirical studies (e.g. Nicotera, 1996).  
Incentives for SD-bias based on the extrinsically expected trait desirability can be opera-
tionalized in three differently elaborate ways, where, except for the most elaborated one, cer-
tain assumptions are made. The standard method – the one-point measure (OPM) – was in-
troduced by Edwards (1957) and is the most parsimonious way to measure incentives for SD-
bias (e.g. Phillips & Clancy, 1972). Respondents are asked to rate the social desirability of a 
particular trait (e.g. having voted in a political election), or in the case of continuous charac-
teristics, that of a high trait intensity (e.g. having strong prejudices against the elderly). Usu-Volker Stocké and Christian Hunkler     5  
 
   
ally bipolar rating scales with a neutral midpoint are used in order to collect the judgments. 
Negative deviations from the neutral scale midpoint are interpreted as incentives to deny and 
positive deviations as incentives to ascribe the trait to the own person. The OPM is a valid 
indicator for the strength and direction of incentives for SD-bias as long the absence of the 
respective trait is perceived as neutrally evaluated. This neutrality assumption and the conse-
quences of its violation are illustrated in figure 1 for the SD-beliefs of four prototypical re-
spondents. In the case of respondent A, the neutrality assumption holds: Whereas the trait 
‘often donating blood’ is perceived with a desirability value of +2 to be positively evaluated, 
the trait ‘never donating blood’ receives a neutral evaluation of zero. Respondent B, in con-
trast, violates the neutrality assumption: Using an OPM gives a value of +2 and one would 
predict the same incentives for SD-bias as for respondent A. However, since never donating 
blood is evaluated mildly negative with -1, this respondent actually perceives stronger incen-
tives for overreporting blood donation than A. Whereas the OPM underestimates the possible 
SD-bias by one third in the case of respondent B, it results in an overestimation when used 
for respondent C. Here, a frequent blood donation receives an evaluation of +2, and thus one 
would assume the same motivation for overreporting donation as in the cases of respondents 
A and B. Since, however, not donating blood has received a desirability score of +2 as well, 
actually no incentives for SD-bias are present. Respondent D, as all others, evaluates frequent 
blood donations with a score of +2. However, since not donating blood is judged to be even 
more positive, this respondent has actually to be expected to underreport blood donations. 
These examples show that violations of the neutrality assumption can cause under- and over-
estimations of SD-bias, as well as a prediction of the wrong direction of this bias.  
-- Figure 1 here -- 
To account for possible violations of the neutrality assumption, simple difference scores 
(SDS) between the judged desirability of the extreme endpoints of the trait-intensity contin-
uum can be used. Here, the neutrality assumption is given up and the incentives for SD-bias 
are operationalized as how different a high and low trait intensity is evaluated. As in the case 
of the OPM, the sign of SDS indicates the direction, and the absolute value the strength of the 
predicted incentives for SD-bias. SDS have rarely been used in applied research (as exception 
cf. Stocké, 2004, 2005a, 2005b).However, SDS as well as OPM imply a further assumption: 
They are only valid as long as the perceived desirability increases or decreases monotonically 
over the trait-intensity continuum. Figure 2 illustrates the consequences of violations of this 
monotony assumption. The prototypical respondent A assumes that donating blood more of-
ten is always judged to be more desirable in society than doing this less often. In this exam-Desirability Beliefs and Socially Desirable Responding   6  
 
ple, the SDS is +4 scale points and thus predicts incentives for overreporting blood dona-
tions. Respondent B, in fact, perceives incentives of the same strength, however here, for 
reporting a medium frequency of this behavior: The medium frequency is regarded four scale 
points more desirable than no blood donations and four points more desirable than very fre-
quent donations. However, SDS (like the OPM) predicts the absence of any incentives for 
SD-bias, since the extreme ends of the frequency continuum are perceived to be equally 
(un)desirable. In the case of U-shaped or reversed U-shaped desirability profiles, the OPM as 
well as SDS always lead to an underestimation of SD-bias and only domain-specific differ-
ence scores (DSDS) are appropriate. This most elaborate measure utilizes the average desir-
ability differences between a low and a medium as well as between a medium and a high trait 
intensity as an indicator for the total incentives for SD-bias. 
-- Figure 2 here -- 
In sum, the two more parsimonious operationalizations for incentives for SD-bias - the 
OPM and the SDS - lead to the same predictions as the DSDS and will thus have perfectly 
convergent validity when the neutrality and monotony assumptions hold. When the neutrality 
assumption is violated, the OPM leads to either an over- or underestimation or a prediction of 
the wrong direction of incentives for SD-bias, whereas violations of monotony lead to all 
kind of errors in the case of OPM, while SDS always underestimate the possible SD-bias. It 
is thus an important question whether and for which questionnaire topics the different viola-
tions occur and to what extent they bias the incentive measures.  
 
4. Previous Research 
4.1 Predictive Power of SD-Beliefs for Social Desirability Bias 
Respondents’ desirability beliefs have in many studies been found to be substantially associ-
ated with their response behavior. Accordingly, individual differences in how desirable sub-
jects perceived traits were positively correlated with the endorsement of the respective re-
sponse options for e.g. cheating in academic contexts (Fernandes & Randall, 1992), having 
the personality trait of argumentativeness (Nicotera, 1996) or symptoms of mental illness 
(Huang, Liao & Chang, 1998). Another study found the association between endorsement 
rates and desirability ratings for 176 personality items to be invariant for an American and 
Turkish college sample (Smith, Smith & Seymour, 1993). Furthermore, SD-ratings of items 
expressing positive affectivity and responses hereon were stronger related when the respon-
dents had a stronger need for social approval (Chen et al., 1997; cf. Phillips & Clancy, 1972 
for conflicting evidence). In all of these studies, the OPM has been utilized.  Volker Stocké and Christian Hunkler     7  
 
   
These correlations are not necessarily indicative for SD-bias and for the explanatory power 
of SD-beliefs: (a) Asking in the same interview about SD-beliefs and the responses on the 
same topic may provoke SD-bias which would otherwise not be present (Chen et al., 1997), 
and (b) the associations may simply result because the respondents truly have socially desir-
able characteristics (Johnson, 2004). Huang and colleagues (1998) addressed the first objec-
tion by recording SD-ratings about 288 items for testing mental health, and the subjects an-
swered these items in a later session. Despite the time between both answers, less symptoms 
of mental illness were reported when they were judged earlier to be less desirable. The sec-
ond objection was tested by collecting self-reports and SD-beliefs about the number of police 
arrests (Wyner, 1980). The subjects’ SD-beliefs explained how strong and in which direction 
the answers differed from the true number of arrests, which were validated with police re-
cords later on. Furthermore, SDS for 10 items measuring racial attitudes were found to pre-
dict how strong and in which direction responses on the same items differed between experi-
mentally induced privacy differences (Stocké, 2004). Under interviewer- rather than self-
administration, subjects answered significantly more in agreement with their SD-beliefs.  
 
4.2  Previous Research about SD-Bias in the Analyzed Topics 
We analyzed the SD-beliefs about four traits, frequently measured in survey research: (a) the 
strength of prejudice toward the elderly, (b) the frequency of charitable donations, (c) the 
regularity of electoral participation and (d) the degree of environmental consciousness. The 
following is known about the presence and determinants of SD-bias for these topics.  
- Prejudices toward the elderly: Several survey studies have assessed the respondents’ 
prejudice toward elderly people with self-report measures.
1 However, no research has been 
done about whether, under which conditions and for which respondent groups SD-bias affects 
survey measures about this trait. Yet, several studies found evidence for SD-bias in reports 
about negative attitudes toward other groups, as for instance African Americans or foreign-
ers. Here, subjects reported less prejudice in interviewer- rather than self-administered inter-
views (Krysan, 1998) and when subjects believed racial prejudice to be increasingly more 
socially undesirable (Phillips & Clancy, 1972). In particular, it has been found that the SD-
beliefs about positive and negative racial attitudes varied considerably between groups of 
respondents, established incentives for SD-bias in the direction of both kinds of attitude an-
swers and the respondents’ answers followed these incentives (Stocké, 2004).  
                                                 
1 In the Eurobarometer 37.1, respondents reported their agreement with items expressing stereotypes about the 
elderly, such as: ‘Elderly people are not willing to listen to younger people’s views’ (ICPSR dataset 9957).  Desirability Beliefs and Socially Desirable Responding   8  
 
- Charitable donations: Questions about whether and to what extent respondents actually 
do or would donate money to certain kinds of charitable organizations are also frequently 
asked in surveys.
2 While some authors suspected that respondents to overreport the extent of 
their charitable contributions (Hall, 2001), there is not much research about whether this 
really is the case. It has been shown for donations of time, money and blood that reporting 
such donations was strongly associated with the respondents’ beliefs that significant others 
expect them to do so (Lee, Piliavin & Call, 1999). More direct evidence for SD-bias has been 
provided in a study where respondents reported whether they contributed money to an envi-
ronmental group either in a private mail or a public telephone survey in the last two years. In 
the mail survey, only 15.5 percent reported such a donation, whereas this rate was with 22.7 
percent significantly higher in the telephone survey (Ethier et al., 2000). The authors argue 
that the insufficient response privacy leads to an impression management-based SD-bias in 
the direction of overreporting donations.  
- Participation in political elections: Survey respondents are frequently asked about 
whether they participated in the most recent elections or in ones held longer ago.
3 Research 
has consistently shown a considerable part of survey participants to report to have voted al-
though they did not. Belli and colleagues (2001) found with data from the American National 
Election Studies (ANES) for elections between 1964 and 1990 that on average 10.2 percent 
of all respondents claim to have participated, but this was not confirmed by the validation 
records. However, only 0.7 percent failed to report a true participation. A few studies tested 
the hypothesis that SD-bias is the reason for vote overreporting. It has been compared which 
percentage of respondents claimed to have voted in three federal elections in Germany when 
their answers were collected either self- or interviewer-administered (Stocké, 2005b). Sub-
jects were significantly more likely to report to have voted when the response privacy was 
low in interviewer-administered interviews. Furthermore, it was found that under interviewer 
administration the survey-based measure for electoral turnout differed significantly from the 
official figures, whereas this was not the case in self-administered interviews.  
Empirical evidence suggests that certain groups of respondents are more likely to overre-
port voting than others. Accordingly, it was found that subjects who overstate their participa-
tion in political elections are more educated (Belli et al., 2001), less wealthy (Traugott & Ka-
tosh, 1979) and more likely African Americans (Abramson & Claggett, 1991). There is fur-
                                                 
2 In the Eurobarometer 28, respondents answered the question: ‘… would you be prepared to give money or to 
give more money than you do now to support some activity to help the third world?’ (ICPSR dataset 9082).  
3 An example is the question asked in all ANES Studies: ‘Do you remember whether you voted in [year] when 
[Democratic Presidential candidate] ran against [Republican Presidential candidate]?’ (ICPSR dataset 8475).  Volker Stocké and Christian Hunkler     9  
 
   
thermore evidence that respondents with higher political involvement (Stocké & Stark, 2006) 
and a stronger sense of civic duty (Karp & Brockington, 2005) tend more to vote overreport-
ing. An empirically not tested explanation for these differences is that certain respondent 
groups assume electoral participation to be more socially desirable than others.  
- Environmental consciousness: Data about the respondents’ environmental consciousness 
has been collected in many surveys.
4 Here, expert ratings of the social desirability of envi-
ronmental-friendly attitudes and behavioral intentions were highly correlated with the en-
dorsement of items measuring these traits (Schahn, 2002). Another study showed that the 
responses on a 45-item scale for measuring environmental consciousness were substantially 
positively correlated with the subjects’ need for social approval (Allen & Ferrand, 1999).  
 
5. Empirical Study 
5.1  Data and Measurement 
The respondents in our study were a multi-stage, local random-probability sample of resi-
dents from a medium-sized city in Germany (about 250,000 inhabitants). Households were 
listed with a random-walk procedure and individual respondents selected with the ‘last-
birthday’ method. Eligible respondents were at least 18 years old and German citizens. The 
SD-beliefs about the four analyzed characteristics were collected in two studies. In order to 
avoid effects due to preceding questions about the desirability of the other topics, respondents 
in both studies were randomly assigned to one of two conditions where they only answered 
questions about one of the topics. Study 1 (N=150) covered the topics ‘participation in politi-
cal elections’ (N=74) and ‘environmental consciousness’ (N=76), whereas in study 2 
(N=144) the topics ‘charitable donations’ (N=74) and ‘prejudices toward the elderly’ (N=70) 
were included. The response rates were 31.3 percent (study 1) and 24.1 percent (study 2). 
The interviews in both studies were conducted computer-assisted in the respondents’ homes. 
The questions about the respondents’ SD-beliefs were asked in the first third of the inter-
views, preceded by questions about the respondents’ sociodemographic characteristics.  
In our study, we utilized the concept of extrinsically expected desirability and thus the re-
spondents’ perceptions about how desirable the respective characteristics were judged by 
others. Respondents were asked how a person would feel when he or she would disclose the 
particular trait in public.
5 The responses were recorded using a nine-point response scale, 
                                                 
4 The Eurobarometer 58.0 utilized for instance five Likert-type items to measure environmental concern, as for 
example: ‘I don’t care about environmental issues’ (ICPSR dataset 3661).  
5 The question wording was as follows: ‘We want to find out what is better not said in public because this 
would provoke negative reactions. In contrast, other statements may arouse positive reactions because they are Desirability Beliefs and Socially Desirable Responding   10 
 
ranging from +4 (‘saying this in public would be very pleasant’) and –4 (‘saying this would 
be very embarrassing’). Aside from the endpoints, the scale midpoint at zero was labeled 
with: ‘this statement would be evaluated neutrally’. For each of the analyzed characteristics, 
the respondents answered three questions. These questions where firstly about how a person 
would feel when stating to have (a) strong, (b) some or (c) no prejudice against elderly peo-
ple. Secondly, subjects reported what they believed somebody would feel when saying that 
he/she donates (a) frequently, (b) occasionally or (c) never money for charitable organiza-
tions. Thirdly, it was recorded what the respondents think how a person would feel when re-
vealing in public to participate (a) always, (b) sometimes and (c) never in political elections. 
Fourthly, subjects reported which feelings they anticipate when somebody revealed in public 
to have (a) a strong, (b) a certain amount and (c) no environmental consciousness.  
On the basis of these desirability ratings, we constructed the different measures for the re-
spondents’ perceived incentives for SD-bias. Firstly, the OPM is simply the raw rating of a 
high trait intensity (TDHI) and thus ranges from -4 (very undesirable) to +4 (very desirable). 
This operationalization is consistent with that used in all other studies in this field of re-
search. Secondly, in order to construct SDS, the raw ratings of a low and a high trait intensity 
were first transformed into a range from 0 (undesirable) to +8 (desirable). Then the trans-
formed rating of a low trait intensity (TDLO) has been subtracted from that of a high intensity 
(TDHI): SDS = TDHI – TDLO. The resulting values ranged between -8 (low trait intensity more 
desirable) to +8 (high trait intensity more desirable). Thirdly, the DSDS are constructed alike 
the SDS, but here the difference between the SD ratings of a low (TDLO) and a medium 
(TDME) trait intensity on the one hand and that between a medium (TDME) and a high (TDHI) 
trait intensity on the other were computed: TDME-LO = TDME – TDLO and TDHI-ME = TDHI – 
TDME. Both domain-specific difference scores ranged from -8 (lower trait intensity is more 
desirable) to +8 (higher trait intensity is more desirable).  
In case of all three operationalizations, the strength of the possible SD-bias is defined by 
the absolute value of the respective measures. In case of the DSDS, this is the sum of the ab-
solute value from the two domains for desirability profiles that do not violate the monotony 
assumption. In contrast, when this was the case, e.g. in case of u-shaped or reverse u-shaped 
profiles, this method would overestimate the possible strength of the SD-bias, since here the 
respondents’ ‘true’ value can only be on one side of the continuum. In these cases, the aver-
                                                                                                                                                        
in agreement with rules about what can be said openly. Could you please tell me for the following characteris-
tics whether it would be embarrassing or pleasant for a person to reveal them in public? We don’t want to 
know how you judge these characteristics personally, but what can be expressed in public and what not’. Volker Stocké and Christian Hunkler     11 
 
   
age absolute value of the two domains has been utilized. Thus, in the case of the OPM, the 
possible strength of SD-bias ranges between 0 and 4, whereas for SDS, this range lies be-
tween 0 and 8. The value range of the latter measure is double compared with the former due 
to the abandonment of the neutrality assumption: In the case of an extreme violation of this 
assumption, for instance when a high trait intensity is evaluated as very positive (+4) and a 
low trait intensity as extremely negative (-4), the OPM detects only half of the true incentives 
for SD-bias. For the DSDS, the strength of SD-bias can vary between 0 and 8 as well. 
 
5.2  Incentives for SD-Bias on the Aggregate Level  
In figure 3, it is presented for the aggregate level how the respondents perceived the SD of 
different intensities of the analyzed trait dimensions. Firstly, we found that the judged desir-
ability increased with the trait intensity for charitable donations, electoral participation and 
for environmental consciousness, whereas more prejudice against the elderly was believed to 
be less positively evaluated. Secondly, the increase or decrease of the trait desirability was by 
no means found to be linear across the different levels of trait intensity for all characteristics. 
In the case of charitable donations and environmental consciousness, the trait desirability 
differed strongly between an absence and a middle strength of these traits, whereas on aver-
age, a medium and a strong trait intensity was practically regarded as equally desirable. Simi-
larly, in case of prejudice against the elderly, it did not make a big difference whether a per-
son reports to have strong or medium prejudice, while having no prejudice at all is assumed 
to be substantially more desirable than the other two trait intensities. In contrast, for the trait 
dimension of electoral participation, the respondents perceived a nearly linear increase in the 
SD when somebody reports to have voted more often in political elections. A third result was 
that on the aggregate level the neutrality assumption did not hold for any of the analyzed top-
ics: For prejudice against the elderly, the absence of this trait is perceived to be evaluated 
statistically significant above the neutral midpoint of the SD-scale, whereas the anticipated 
evaluation of a low intensity of the other trait dimensions deviated significantly into the nega-
tive direction (prejudice: t=9.0, df=69; donation: t=-3.2, df=73; participation: t=-4.9, df=73; 
environment: t=-13.1, df=75; all p ≤ .01). On the aggregate level, the monotony assumption 
seems to be valid, since, except for a slight and statistically not significant decrease in the 
SD-ratings of donations between a medium and high trait intensity, the desirability profiles 
increase or decrease monotonically across the intensity dimensions (t=1.2, df=73, p > .10).  
-- Figure 3 here -- Desirability Beliefs and Socially Desirable Responding   12 
 
When the respondents in the sample perceive incentives for SD-bias into different directions, 
these differences at least partly cancel each other out on the aggregate level. Thus, we util-
ized the average absolute values of the different measures in order to compare their predic-
tions about the strength of incentives for SD-bias in the case of the different trait dimensions 
(cf. table 1). Firstly, we found for all analyzed traits the simple difference scores, compared 
with the one-point measure, to predict significantly stronger incentives for socially desirable 
responding (prejudice: t=7.1, df=69; donation: t=2.4, df=73; participation: t=6.6, df=73; envi-
ronment: t=13.6, df=75; all p ≤ .01). As we show below, this is the consequence of violations 
of the neutrality assumption. Comparing how strong the two measures disagree revealed that 
this was strongest for the trait ‘environmental consciousness’ (2.4 scale points) and weakest 
for ‘charitable donations’ (0.6 scale points), the other two topics taking an intermediate posi-
tion (1.8 and 1.5 scale points). This suggests strongest violations of the neutrality assumption 
in the case of ‘environmental consciousness’ and weakest for ‘charitable donations’. Sec-
ondly, comparing the SDS and the DSDS showed that the latter measure predicts in two out 
of four topics significantly stronger incentives for SD-bias (prejudice: t=2.2, df=69; donation: 
t=2.8, df=73; both: p ≤ .05; participation: t=0.3, df=73; environment: t=0.6, df=7, both: p > 
.10). This result suggests, and this will be tested in the following section, that the monotony 
assumption has been violated more in the case of the first two topics.  
-- Table 1 here -- 
 
5.3  Prevalence and Effects of Violations of the Neutrality and Monotony Assumptions 
Table 2 presents for the analyzed questionnaire topics for which proportion of the total sam-
ple (a) the neutrality assumption, (b) the monotony assumption or (c) both assumptions at the 
same time have been found to be violated. The results have shown firstly that in the case of 
all trait dimensions only a minority of between 28.4 (charitable donations) and 2.6 (environ-
mental consciousness) percent of the respondents have not violated at least one of the two 
assumptions. Secondly, violations of neutrality are by far the quantitatively more extensive 
problem across all topics, compared with violations of monotony. The latter occurred in be-
tween 14.2 percent (‘prejudice against the elderly’) and 33.8 percent (‘charitable donations’) 
of the cases, and was most often accompanied by violations of neutrality. The proportion of 
the total sample where neutrality is violated varies between 66.2 percent (‘charitable dona-
tions’) and amounts to 94.8 percent (‘environmental consciousness’). Thirdly, our data con-
firmed our assumption that differences in the violation of the neutrality assumption (78.6, 
66.2, 79.7, 94.8 percent for the four traits) explain how strong the OPM underestimates the Volker Stocké and Christian Hunkler     13 
 
   
potential SD-bias compared with the SDS (1.8, 0.6, 1.5, 2.4 scale points for the four traits): 
The correlation between the two quantities was r=.96 and statistically significant (p ≤ .05). 
The same was, however, not true for the percentage of violations of the monotony assump-
tion (14.2, 33.8, 17.6, 31.6 percent for the four traits) and the differences in the estimated 
strength of incentives for SD-bias between the OPM and DSDS (1.9, 1.0, 1.5, 2.5 scale points 
for the four traits): The association here was r=-.08 and did not prove to be significant (p > 
.10).  
-- Table 2 here -- 
In table 3, the consequences of violations of neutrality are shown in detail. Firstly, when such 
a violation occurred, this leads the OPM much more frequently to under- than to overestimate 
the incentives for SD-bias: On average across the traits, 16.5 percent lead to an overestima-
tion, but in 80.8 percent an underestimation occurred, whereas only in 2.4 percent a wrong 
direction of incentives was predicted. However, the consequences, when neutrality did not 
hold, varied considerably across the trait dimensions. Furthermore, the average strength of 
underestimation (between 2.3 and 3.0 scale points) is for each trait at least as strong as that of 
an overestimation (between 1.3 and 2.4 scale points). Thus, as already found in the previous 
paragraph, violations of neutrality cause an underestimation of potential SD-bias.  
-- Table 3 here -- 
Respondents may assume a high, a low, a medium or both extreme trait intensities to be most 
socially desirable, and thus perceive incentives for SD-bias in different directions. Table 4 
presents the direction of incentives for SD-bias which has actually been derived from DSDS. 
Firstly, between 50.0 and 67.6 percent of all respondents assumed that more frequent dona-
tions, as well as participating in political elections more often and having a stronger envi-
ronmental consciousness always lead to more positive evaluations, and 70 percent assumed 
to have less prejudice against the elderly to have this consequence. Only a very small minor-
ity of up to 5.7 percent of the respondents assumed a linear increase of desirability differ-
ences in the opposite direction. Secondly, in the case of charitable donations and environ-
mental consciousness, we found substantial proportions of respondents to have inverse u-
shaped desirability profiles: 27.0 percent assumed sometimes donating and having a medium 
degree of environmental consciousness to be most socially desirable. In the case of the other 
two topics, this kind of incentives for SD-bias was perceived by few respondents only. This 
is true for u-shaped desirability profiles as well: Only between 2.6 and 9.5 percent of all re-
spondents assumed a medium trait intensity to be most undesirable. Thirdly, except for the 
trait ‘environmental consciousness’, in case of all topics about 10 percent of the subjects per-Desirability Beliefs and Socially Desirable Responding   14 
 
ceived a weak, medium and strong trait intensity to be identically evaluated. We can thus 
conclude that the violation of monotony results for the OPM and the SDS in the case of 
‘charitable donations’ and ‘environmental consciousness’ in predictions of wrong direction of 
the SD-bias.  
-- Table 4 here -- 
When the monotony assumption is violated, OPM and SDS always predict the wrong di-
rection of SD-bias. In table 5a, it is shown which consequences this violation has for the 
strength of SD-bias predicted by the OPM, when compared with the correct measure obtained 
on the basis of DSDS. According to our results, the presence of non-linear SD-beliefs leads 
the OPM in the majority of the cases to overestimate the true strength of SD-bias: On average 
across all items, this happened in 52.6 percent of the cases, whereas an underestimation was 
found for 26.7 percent and a correct prediction for 20.7 percent of the respondents.  
-- Table 5a here -- 
The consequences of violations of the monotony assumption were different for the SDS. In 
case of this measure, incentives for SD-bias were underestimated in the majority of the cases: 
This was found on average across the trait dimension for 60 percent of the cases, whereas the 
measurement error was for 33.9 percent of the affected respondents in the direction of an 
overestimation of incentives, and for 6.1 percent the strength of SD-bias was correctly pre-
dicted. In summary, the net effect of violations of monotony on the predicted strength of SD-
bias was found to differ between the two less elaborated incentive measures.  
-- Table 5b here -- 
5.4  Convergent Validity in Predicting the Strength of Incentives for SD-Bias  
In the final section of this paper, we analyzed under which conditions the more parsimonious 
OPM and SDS measures predicted more or less the same strength of incentives for SD-bias 
as the most valid DSDS. Thus, we tested with a series of OLS regressions, the strength of 
SD-bias predicted from the DSDS being dependent, for which of the questionnaire topics and 
for the violation of which assumption the more parsimonious measures were more or less 
consistent with this most elaborated measure. We constructed a pooled dataset consisting of 
the three incentive measures, obtained for the four questionnaire topics. Thus, the dataset 
consisted of N=294 cases, where dummy variables indicated from which subsample, and thus 
from which trait dimension a particular observation has been obtained.  
In the first step of the analysis, we estimated a base model where only control variables for 
the respondents’ sociodemographic characteristics and topic dummies were included (cf. ta-
ble 6a, model 1). The results have shown that the total strength of perceived incentives for Volker Stocké and Christian Hunkler     15 
 
   
SD-bias did not differ according to the subjects’ sex, age or education. The positive regres-
sion parameter for the trait dummies indicated that subjects perceived, compared with the 
trait of charitable donations, significantly stronger incentives for SD-bias when they an-
swered questions about the other traits. However, these differences were only statistically 
significant for ‘environmental consciousness’ and ‘prejudice against the elderly’. Secondly, 
we tested to what degree the OPM, across all questionnaire topics, predicted the same 
strength of incentives as the DSDS (cf. table 6a, model 2). This effect was found to be statis-
tically significant and increased the explained variance from 7.2 percent in the base model to 
51.8 percent. Thus, the most parsimonious measure captured 44.6 percent of the real variation 
of incentives for SD-bias. Thirdly, we tested whether this convergent validity differed be-
tween the questionnaire topics. This was accomplished by adding multiplicative terms be-
tween each topic dummy and the OPM into the model. According to the estimated interaction 
parameters, the OPM agreed significantly stronger with the DSDS in the case of the traits 
‘electoral participation’ and ‘prejudice against the elderly’, compared with the reference 
category ‘charitable donations’. The convergent validity of the OPM was in the case of ‘envi-
ronmental consciousness’, however, not significantly higher than for the reference topic. This 
result may be due to stronger violations of the neutrality assumption in the case of the traits 
with less validity. This was tested fourthly by controlling for an interaction term between the 
OPM and how strong the neutrality assumption was violated (cf. table 6a, model 4).
6 Al-
though the actual strength of incentives predicted from the DSDS was significantly higher, 
the stronger the neutrality assumption was violated, the latter factor did neither explain the 
convergent validity of the one-point measure, nor the differences in the convergent validity 
between the topics: The interaction parameter was not statistically significant, and did only 
reduce, but not absorb the effect of the topic dummies. However, taking the strength of viola-
tions of neutrality into account increased the explained variance substantially from 52.3 to 
72.0 percent. If it is not mainly the fact how strong the neutrality assumption has been vio-
lated which explains the differences in construct validity between the trait dimension, this 
may be due to how strong the monotony assumption did not hold. This was tested by addi-
tionally including an interaction term between the one-point measure and the magnitude to 
which the monotony assumption has been violated into the regression equations (cf. table 6a, 
model 5).
7 The significant negative interaction parameter indicated that the predictions from 
                                                 
6 The strength of this violation is the absolute value of how strongly the judged desirability of a low trait inten-
sity deviates from a neutral evaluation at zero.  
7 How strongly the monotony assumption has been violated is the absolute value of the difference between the 
SDS and the DSDS.  Desirability Beliefs and Socially Desirable Responding   16 
 
the OPM are less consistent with those from the DSDS when the monotony assumption was 
stronger violated. However, controlling for these differences did still not completely explain 
the validity differences of the OPM between the questionnaire topics: This measure had 
higher validity for the trait ‘environmental consciousness’, compared with that of ‘charitable 
donations’.  
-- Table 6a here -- 
In a next step, we tested whether the SDS were, compared with the OPM, the better indica-
tor for the strength of incentives from SD-bias (cf. table 6b, model 6). The results indicated 
firstly that this measure is much stronger associated with the DSDS values: Including SDS 
increased the explained variance, taking the base model 1 as a starting point, from 7.2 to 85.1 
percent, and thus the SDS captured 77.9 percent of the real strength of incentives for SD-bias. 
Thus, compared to the 44.6 percent in the case of the OPM, this is a substantial improvement 
in convergent validity. Secondly, the SDS successfully captured the between-item differences 
in the strength of SD-bias, which have been found in model 1: After controlling for the SDS 
scores, the topic dummies did not prove to be statistically significant anymore.  
In the last step of the analysis, we tested for differences in the strength of the association 
between the SDS and DSDS between the trait dimensions. We expected a lower convergent 
validity in the case of questionnaire topics where stronger violations of monotony have been 
observed. This has been tested by computing interaction terms between the topic dummies 
and the SDS-measure, which were then included into the regression equation (cf. table 6b, 
model 7). The results have shown that SDS were a significantly better indicator for the actual 
incentives for SD-bias in case of the topics ‘electoral participation’ and ‘prejudice against the 
elderly’, compared to the other topics ‘environmental consciousness’ and ‘charitable dona-
tions’. This can be attributed to the fact that the latter trait dimensions have been found in 
table 4 to be substantially more prone to violations of monotony, and thus the SDS to be 
much more susceptible to measurement error.  
6. Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper, we compared the validity of three differently elaborated and thus differently 
parsimonious measures for the strength and direction of incentives for SD-bias respondents 
perceive when answering survey questions. We have shown firstly that apart from domain-
specific difference scores (DSDS) as the most elaborated measure, the validity of the other 
two depends on whether specific assumptions are fulfilled in each case: Whereas simple dif-
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ference scores (SDS) only require the trait desirability to increase or decrease monotonically 
across the trait-intensity continuum (monotony assumption), the one-point measure (OPM), 
as the least elaborated operationalization, requires monotony and additionally that the re-
spondents neutrally evaluate the absence of the respective trait as well (neutrality assump-
tion). As we have shown in the theoretical part of our study, violations of both assumptions 
can be expected to cause error in the predicted strength and direction of SD-bias. It has how-
ever not been tested whether such violations occur, whether their prevalence differs between 
questionnaire topics and whether they have indeed negative effects on the validity of the af-
fected measures. In our empirical part, we thus utilized four trait dimensions, which are fre-
quently measured in survey research, in order to analyze these open questions.  
Our results proved firstly that the neutrality assumption has been violated by the majority 
of the respondents, in the case of all analyzed trait dimensions: Having no prejudice against 
the elderly, making no charitable donations, not voting in political elections and having a 
weak environmental consciousness were rarely evaluated neutrally. Although this violation 
seldom biased the direction of predicted SD-bias, it leads in 80 percent of the affected cases 
the OPM to substantially underestimate the real strength of SD-bias. This measurement error, 
however, varied between the different questionnaire topics: The strongest error has been 
found for the trait ‘environmental consciousness’, and the measure for ‘charitable donations’ 
was least affected. Secondly, our analysis revealed that certain groups of respondents did not 
simply assume that more charitable donations and a stronger environmental consciousness 
are more socially desirable. Instead, in both cases nearly 30 percent of the sample assumed a 
medium trait intensity to be most desirable: These subjects perceive incentives for selecting 
an answer at the middle of the trait continuum. In these cases where the monotony assump-
tion has been violated, both the OPM and SDS predicted the wrong direction of incentives for 
SD-bias. Furthermore, we found that the OPM suffered in these cases mainly from an overes-
timation of SD-bias, whereas in the majority of cases, the SDS underestimated the total in-
centives for SD-bias. Thirdly, leaving the quantitatively negligible problem of predictions of 
a wrong direction of SD-bias aside, we found violations of neutrality to lead to a low conver-
gent validity in case of the OPM: Only about 44.6 percent of the, according to the DSDS ac-
tually present incentives for socially desirable response behavior were captured by this meas-
ure. This leads to the conclusion that at least the measurement effort associated with SDS, 
which does not require the neutrality assumption to hold, has to be undertaken in order to 
obtain a valid measurement of potential SD-bias. In agreement herewith, this measure proved 
to be much more valid in predicting the strength of incentives for SD-bias: Across all topics, Desirability Beliefs and Socially Desirable Responding   18 
 
altogether 77.9 percent of the incentives for SD-bias have been captured by this indicator. In 
case of the trait dimensions ‘prejudice against the elderly’ and ‘electoral participation’, this 
indicator can be regarded to be sufficiently elaborated to provide a good prediction for which 
incentives respondents perceive for SD-bias. However, for the questionnaire topics ‘charita-
ble donations’ and ‘environmental consciousness’, this measure had substantially weaker 
convergent validity: Here, SDS predict for those respondents with inverse u-shaped desirabil-
ity profiles the wrong direction of SD-bias. Furthermore, the strength of SD-bias has been 
substantially underestimated in these cases. Thus, for the affected questionnaire topics, only 
the most elaborated DSDS are a valid measure for the strength and direction of SD-bias in 
survey data.  
The validity of our results is conditional on the following factors. Firstly, even those meas-
ures we identified to provide valid measures for incentives for SD-bias must be regarded to 
provide an indicator for the upper limit of real SD-bias, which has to be expected in survey 
data. Accordingly, impression management-based SD-bias has been found to be much 
weaker or even absent when the respondents’ privacy and anonymity are successfully en-
sured (e.g. Tourangeau et al., 2002). Thus, under these conditions, for instance in self-
administered surveys, respondents’ answers can be expected to be less strongly biased by 
their SD-beliefs than this measure suggests. Furthermore, each of the incentive measures ana-
lyzed in this paper presuppose that the respondents’ true characteristics are diametrically op-
posed to those they perceive as the most desirable. The more, however, the true score and the 
most desirable response option converge, the less the incentives for SD-bias will actually bias 
survey data. Accordingly, our incentive measures will be more diagnostic for response bias 
when the characteristics regarded to be least desirable are increasingly more prevalent in the 
survey sample.  
Secondly, our study provides the first in-depth analysis of which answers respondents per-
ceive as the most desirable in the case of four often used questionnaire topics, and how much 
measurement effort is necessary to obtain a valid indicator for which incentives respondents 
perceive for SD-bias. This was done with a small, regionally restricted sample of respon-
dents. Since the representativeness of the data was therefore restricted, our results cannot be 
simply generalized without further evidence, and therefore must be at present regarded to be 
tentative. However, within these restrictions, our results clearly suggest a tradeoff between 
parsimony and validity when differently elaborated measures for incentives for SD-bias are 
utilized. This issue deserves more attention in future research.  Volker Stocké and Christian Hunkler     19 
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   Low Medium    High 
 Topic  N  Mean (STD)  Mean (STD)  Mean (STD) 
 1. Prejudice  70  2.0 (1.9)  -1.1 (2.1)  -1.6 (2.2) 
 2. Donation  74  -0.7 (1.9)  1.8 (1.7)  1.5 (2.0) 
 3. Participation  74  -1.2 (2.1)  0.4 (2.0)  2.3 (1.5) 
 4. Environment  76  -2.4 (1.6)  2.0 (1.8)  2.3 (1.8) 




Table 1: Predicted strength of SD-bias using the different desirability measures 










Topic  Mean  (STD) Mean (STD) Mean (STD) Mean (STD) Mean  (STD) 
1.  Prejudice  2.3  (1.5) 4.1 (2.9) 1.0 (1.2) 3.5 (2.6) 4.2  (2.7) 
2.  Donation  2.2  (1.1) 2.8 (2.1) 1.3 (1.6) 3.0 (2.3) 3.2  (1.9) 
3.  Participation  2.4  (1.3) 3.9 (2.6) 2.3 (2.2) 2.2 (2.1) 3.9  (2.5) 
4.  Environment  2.6  (1.3) 5.0 (2.3) 1.7 (1.9) 4.6 (2.3) 5.1  (2.1) 




Table 2: Prevalence of violations of the neutrality and monotony assumptions 









Topic  % (N) % (N) % (N)  % (N)  %  (N) 
1. Prejudice  7.1 (5)  71.5 (50)  7.1 (  5)  14.3 (10)  100.0 (70) 
2. Donation  5.4 (4)  37.8 (28)  28.4 (21)  28.4 (21)  100.0 (74) 
3. Participation  0.0 (0)  62.1 (46) 17.6 (13)  20.3 (15)  100.0  (74) 
4. Environment  2.6 (2)  65.8 (50)  29.0 (22)  2.6 (  2)  100.0 (76) 
All   3.8 (11)  59.3 (174)  20.5 (61)  16.4 (48)  100.0 (294) 
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Table 3: Consequences of violations of the neutrality assumption for the predicted strength 
and direction of incentives for SD-bias 
  Overestimation 
  Underestimation 
  Wrong direction 
  Total 
Topic  %  (N) Mean
  %  (N) Mean %  (N) Mean %  (N) 
1. Prejudice  12.7  (  7)  2.4  85.5  (47)  3.0  1.8  (1)  4.0  100.0  (55) 
2. Donation  30.6  (15)  2.3  67.4  (33) 2.3  2.0  (1) 3.0  100.0  (49) 
3. Participation  18.6  (11)  1.8  81.4 (48)  2.7  0.0  (0)  --  100.0  (59) 
4. Environment    4.2  (  3)  1.3  88.9  (64)  2.9  6.9  (5)  2.6  100.0  (72) 
All   16.5  (36)  2.0  80.8  (192) 2.7  2.7  (7)  2.4  100.0  (235) 
Note: ‘Overestimation’ and ‘underestimation’ indicates the one-point measure to predict stronger or weaker 
incentives for SD-bias, compared with simple difference scores. ‘Wrong direction’ indicates that the one-point 
measure predicts incentives in the opposite direction. The means represents the average strength of the devia-




Table 4: Type and prevalence of violations of monotony  
 Prejudice  Donation  Participation  Environment 
  % (N)  % (N)  % (N)  % (N) 
Incentives for high trait intensity  5.7   (4)  50.0 (37)  67.6 (50)  65.8 (50) 
Incentives for low trait intensity  70.0 (49)  5.4   (4)  4.0   (3)  1.3   (1) 
Incentives u-shaped  8.6   (6)  6.8   (5)  9.5  (7)  2.6   (2) 
Incentives inverse u-shaped  5.7   (4)  27.0 (20)  8.1  (6)  29.0 (22) 
No incentives  10.0   (7)  10.8   (8)  10.8  (8)  1.3   (1) 




Table 5a: Consequences of violations of monotony for the one-point measure  
  Underestimation 
  Overestimation Correct  prediction
  Total 
Topic  % (N)  Mean  % (N)  Mean % (N) Mean  % (N)  Mean
1. Prejudice  20.0  (  2)  2.5  30.0  (  3)  2.0  50.0  (5)  0.0  100.0 (10)  1.1 
2.  Donation  40.0 (10)  2.3  44.0 (11) 2.2 16.0  (4)  0.0  100.0  (25) 1.9 
3. Participation  38.5  (  5)  2.0  61.5  (  8)  2.5    0.0  (0)  --  100.0 (13)  2.3 
4. Environment   8.3  (  2)  1.8  75.0  (18)  2.7  16.7  (4)  0.0  100.0 (24)  2.2 
All  (average)  26.7 (19)  2.2  52.6 (39) 2.4 20.7  (9)  0.0  100.0  (72) 1.9 
Note: Overestimation and underestimation indicate that the one-point measure predicts stronger or weaker 
incentives for SD-bias, compared with the domain-specific difference scores. The means indicates the aver-
age strength of the deviations between the two measures.  
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Table 5b: Consequences of violations of monotony for simple difference scores 
  Underestimation 
  Overestimation Right  prediction
  Total 
Topic  % (N)  Mean  % (N)  Mean % (N) Mean  % (N)  Mean
1. Prejudice  80.0  (  8)  1.4  20.0  (  2)  0.5  0.0  (0)  --  100.0 (10)  1.2 
2.  Donation  64.0 (16)  2.3  16.0 (    4) 1.2 20.0  (5)  0.0  100.0  (25) 1.7 
3. Participation  46.2  (  6)  1.7  53.9  (  7)  1.1  0.0  (0)  --  100.0 (13)  1.4 
4.  Environment  50.0 (12)  1.8  45.8 (11)  1.4  4.2 (1)  0.0  100.0  (24)  1.5 
All  (average)  60.0   1.8  33.9   1.1  6.1   0.0  100.0   1.5 
Note: Overestimation and underestimation indicate that the simple difference scores predict stronger or 
weaker incentives for SD-bias, compared with the domain-specific difference scores. The means indicates the 
average strength of the deviations between the two measures.  
 
 
Table 6a: Capability of the one-point measure for predicting the strength of incentives from 
SD-bias (OLS-regression results)  
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
  B(t)  B(t) B(t) B(t) B(t) 
Demographic Controls        
- Sex (female)  0.41( 1.5)  0.44( 2.2)
* 0.42( 2.1)
* 0.33( 2.2)
* 0.30(  2.0)
*
- Age (years)  0.00( 0.0)  -0.00(-0.2)  -0.00(-0.5) -0.01(-1.5) -0.01(-1.2) 
- Education (years)  0.04( 0.5)  0.03( 0.4)  0.02( 0.3)  0.02( 0.5)  0.02( 0.4) 
Topic Controls        
- Donation (Ref.Cat.)         
- Participation  0.66( 1.7)  0.47( 1.7) -0.72(-1.2) -0.72(-1.6) -0.50(-1.1) 
- Environment  1.91( 5.1)
** 1.43( 5.2)
** 0.63( 1.0)  -0.02(-0.0)  -0.50(-1.0) 
- Prejudice  1.00( 2.6)
* 0.90(  3.2)
** -0.06(-0.1) -0.15(-0.3) -0.13(-0.3) 
Explanatory Variables        
- One-point measure (OPM)  - -- 1.21(16.3)
** 0.85( 5.0)
** 0.62( 4.4)
** 0.71(  5.1)
**
- Participation * OPM  - -- - -- 0.53(  2.3)
* 0.35( 2.0)
* 0.30(  1.8) 
- Environment * OPM  - -- - --  0.36( 1.6)  0.25( 1.4)  0.40( 2.2)
*
- Prejudice * OPM  - -- - -- 0.43(  2.0)
* 0.17( 1.0)  0.17( 1.0) 
- Violation of Neutrality - -- - -- - -- 0.80(  7.3)
** 0.86(  8.0)
**
- Neutrality * OPM  - -- - -- - --  0.02( 0.6)  0.01( 0.2) 
- Violations of Monotony - -- - -- - -- - -- 0.95(  4.0)
**
- Monotony * OPM  - -- - -- - -- - -- -0.31(-4.6)
**
Intercept  2.52( 2.1)
*  0.08( 0.1)  1.05( 1.1)  0.43( 0.6)  0.11( 0.2) 








* p ≤ .05, 
** p ≤ .01; N=294.  
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Table 6b: Capability of simple difference scores for predicting the strength of 
incentives from SD-bias (OLS-regression results) 
  Model 6  Model 7 
 B (t)  B  (t) 
Demographic Controls     
- Sex (female)  -0.07 (-0.6)  -0.08  (-0.8) 
- Age (years)  -0.00 (-0.5)  -0.00  (-0.8) 
- Education (years)  0.04 ( 1.0)  0.02  ( 0.5) 
Topic Controls        
- Donation (Ref.Cat.)       
- Participation  -0.25 (-1.6)  -0.96  (-3.7)
** 
- Environment  -0.04 (-0.2)  -0.13  (-0.4) 
- Prejudice  -0.10 (-0.6)  -0.88  (-3.4)
** 
Explanatory Variables       
- Simple difference scores (SDS)  0.85 (38.7)
** 0.69  (13.7)
** 
- Participation * SDC  - -  0.23  (  3.5)
** 
- Environment * SDC  - -  0.09  (  1.3) 
- Prejudice * SDC  - -  0.24  (  3.9)
** 
Intercept  0.58 ( 1.2)  1.27  (  2.5)
* 





* p ≤ .05, 
** p ≤ .01; N=294. 
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